A consistent thread weaves through all the articles in this edition. Each author, in some fashion, reflects upon the dual concepts of a 'global green public sphere' and the 'global governance state', as they intersect with the politics of environmentalism.
2 lionise concepts of 'the local', and it can be utilised to denigrate local systems of meaning in a neo-colonial fashion.
Introduction
There may be some intrinsic characteristics of environmental movements which allow them to range so freely across and within traditional geopolitical divisions. First, as Duffy argues in this collection, 'Since environmental problems are often transboundary, they have become an important arena for the development of transnational networks to manage them (this volume). In this light, it may simply be that environmental ills determine, to an extent, that transboundary crossings must be made. There is no doubt that there is some truth to this hypothesis. To some extent, there may be an ecologically determined imperative which has increasingly pushed environmentalists across the globe to work more closely together. As Rootes argues (this volume), '…there has developed a shared concern, grounded in a more systemic analysis of the sources of environmental ills. It would be pointless, Rootes suggests, to protect a particular species of bird, if key habitats along the migratory routes were destroyed elsewhere.
Whilst accepting that non-human nature possesses some essential properties, it must be understood that the 'environment' and its management are also concepts that are socially constructed. In short, regardless of how essential the 'environment' actually is, one must also consider the social movement, which shapes and delivers its message. (Whatmore 2002) Concepts of environment, then, are far from apolitical; rather, they are the exact opposite. As Rootes recognises, of at least equal importance is the increased collaboration between environmental non-governmental organisations over the decades. Their interplay creates new borders and frontiers leading to new and diverse geopolitical alliances, drawn upon political imaginations of a transnational character. This is not to suggest for a moment that social movement environmentalism exclusively inhabits the political realms, below, above or around the politics of nations. Nor is it to suggest that environmental movements only pursue a politics without history. Transnational politics obviously do not occur in a void. Although 3 social movements often break through realist geopolitical boundaries, as aforesaid, they are still premised on nation-state assumptions. Post-structuralism and postmodernity are rooted in structuralism and modernity. As a consequence national interpretations of green political space -and the political opportunity structures which restrict them -as we have seen in France (Hayes), Hungary (Kerėnyi and Szabó) or Bosnia and Herzegovina (Fagan) are still immensely powerful as they interplay with this additional layer of increased transnational influence.
Due to the transnational currency of environmental activism, environmental politics is often mentioned in the same breath as the phrase 'global civil society' (GCS). The universal appeal of environmentalism -in all its guises -coupled with the organic characteristics of social movements, have seen environmental NGOs, and informal networks become visible parts of an ever-increasing transnational and globalised third sector. Often, all third sector political entities are all thrown into the same, almost omnipresent, conceptual basket of civil society; but the component parts of environmental social movements are impossibly varied in their contributions to transnational politics. In fact, the blurring between concepts of 'global civil society' and 'global governance', as well distinctions between third, private and public sectors are increasingly commonplace. This is why we use the term green public sphere to denote the sphere of dialogue and debate between different forms of environmentalism, based on the arguments of Torgerson (this volume).
The abilities of environmental movements to cross national boundaries leads to a multitude of outcomes. First, there are those parts of a green public space which can be understood in emancipatory terms, building regional and global networks in a manner which increases the power resources of the poor and the environmentally degraded. In the following analysis, these transnational players will be referred to as emancipatory groups (EGs). These emancipatory groups have a strong social movement dimension, as defined in the Introduction to this volume. Often, but not always, they construct themselves as separate from any notion of the state whether it be national or transnational -including green governance states -and often in rugged opposition to what they perceive to be a global neoliberal project. These EGs, often through grassroots networking, develop shared techniques, strategies, and repertoires of action alongside more localised networks and groups and they celebrate more non-institutional forms of organisation. It is in this manner, that the aforementioned national repertoires of resistance are shared and transmuted across borders. These organisations see a clear divide between the concepts of a global green public sphere and an environmentalised governance state; seeing themselves as part of the former, but remaining outside the latter.
Other groups -particularly powerful and well-resourced environmental NGOs -are denoted here as part of the environmental governance state (EGS). They position themselves as part of the neoliberal project of the global governance state, using limited -usually postmaterialist -interpretations of green concerns to continue to discipline societies which do not mirror their own constructions of nature, or what, in their minds, constitutes a productive and democratic civil society. These large transnational organisations, usually based in the North, construct grand narratives and systems of meaning, while giving some voice to the local, also often herding diverse forms of environmental opposition into one omnipresent story -such as climate change -gutting the stories of the local.
Green Public Spheres as spaces for Ecological Emancipation
In his article, Rootes seeks to trace the changes due to globalisation of three British organisations: the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Friends of the Earth (FoE) and Greenpeace (GP). As a crucial part of this globalisation process, Rootes sees a move away from their traditionally narrow conservation focus by WWF to incorporate the sustainable development concerns of 'the global south', bringing them closer to the political ecology perspectives of groups as FoE Whether of course this is a 'radicalisation' of goals to reflect those of the South (Rootes, this volume), or simply a means to co-opt southern agendas is open to debate; but there is no doubt that this broadening of previously narrow conservation objectives is a hallmark of transnational environmental politics in an increasingly globalised world. exploitation. This failure to address past exploitation patterns and an inability to focus on issues of redistributive justice drove a shard of ice into the very heart of the FoE confereration which, to its credit, engaged on an intense process of dialogue and debate on these issues. These tensions in EGs are constant, as they openly wrestle with their capacities to liberate, on the one hand, and to denigrate on the other. These moral dilemmas are not so evident in those large green transnational organisations we refer to here as the global green governance state.
Green Governance State
In Duffy's article on transnational environmental management in Madagascar, she argues that in the case of the South, increasingly close relationships between states, global environmental NGOs, private companies and the World Bank make it more appropriate to talk of the production of governance states, rather than the creation of a separate global civil society. NGOs like WWF and Conservation International work so closely with the interests of transnational capital and nation-states that they often become part of the same donor consortiums. In Magagascar, the Donor Consortium is comprised of USAID, the German Government, the Japanese Government, The French Government, the Swiss Government, Conservation International, WWF, Wildlife Conservation Society, and the World Bank.
In this picture, sovereignty is not a delimitation of one geographical space over another (nation-states); but is a space 'formed through a series of practices which are defined by an interaction of forces' (Duffy, this volume), including some powerful environmental NGOs. In this model, NGOs are just as much part of sovereign, global governance states as national governments. This means that funding is mistakenly directed to the creation of civil society, which is interpreted as establishing expertise rather than an independent green public sphere. Similar outcomes occurred in Hungary (Kerėnyi and Szabó) where after 1989 aid from the United States, and later from the EU, followed a similar agenda of the creation of civil society, which had the contradictory result of depoliticising environmentalism.
In these cases, environmental concerns rarely reflect the needs and aspirations of local people. Associated with the aid and donorship programs are attached conditionalities.
These conditions for 'rebuilding societies' -whether it be after a war, after communism, after terrorism, or after colonialism -most usually include a pluralist, democratic system of governance, coupled with a neoliberal interpretation of the market-place. In this vein, NGOs are constructed as vehicles which can recreate and reconfigure societal relationships, replacing and ignoring social systems of the 'old order'. The old, intra-national relationships are constructed as the problem: the West or the North (whatever the construction of the polarity) is the solution. This is synonomous with 'the objective of colonial discourse', as Torgerson would have it.
According to Homi Bhabba, the objective is 'to construe the colonised as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction' (quoted in Torgerson, this volume). But, with a lack of continuous funding, one set of top-down NGOs is replaced by others better positioned to achieve success under the latest round of funding creating an orientation towards external funders and away from representing local people. There is no support offered to lasting administrative and social structures that would allow citizens to decide and implement appropriate management structures, as indigenous networks are shunned.
In a controversial article published in World Watch by Mac Chapin, the funding of three of the largest of these environmental governance organisations -WWF, Conservation International (CI) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC) -was explored in some detail (Chapin 2004) . Chapin concludes that the funding arrangements of 'the big three' are intermeshed with the vested interests of transnational capital. This funding has made these organisations more dependent on large amounts of cash emanating from other parts of the governance state, leading to strong market competition between them. More importantly, this funding regime, has led to the decimation of local organisations. He writes:
In dealing with smaller organizations, either they tend to use their sheer heft to press their agendas unilaterally or they exclude the smaller groups altogether. A common tactic is to create new organizations out of whole cloth in foreign countries, implanting local bodies as extensions of themselves (Chapin 2004: 25) .
The dominance of these large organisations is without precedence since the first emergence of the modern environmental movements in the 1960s, and its impacts are far-reaching. In Hungary, for example, Kerényi and Szabo argue that top-down The emergence of this EGS -with its tightly controlled postmaterialist focus -may not actually denote trends towards democratic change at all but, rather, the construction of a state-controlled civil society, or worse, a hollow construction with civil society only marked by the clever use of nomenclature and imitation. In the cases of Iran or Burma (Doyle and Simpson) included in this edition, this public mobilisation may actually be an indicator of authoritarianism, or even totalitarianism, rather than an indicator towards democratic change. Or, alternatively, the emergence of these kinds of EGS can be seen as an indicator of free markets taking root in a given society. Even in an authoritarian regime such as Iran, the language of corporate globalisation is never far away: the reinvigoration of the third or 'civil society' sector is not really about empowering citizens; but rather, it is seen as a convenient way to 'downsize government' and reduce its direct responsibilities in emvironmental policymaking.
These environmental governance organisations, with their increasing dominance of the green political space, are increasingly building and selling grand environmental narratives with global reach. Climate change is the current theme used most often in the ecopolitical marketplace. These stories are the songlines of ecological conditionality, mapping out the co-ordinates that determine which groups shall be included in agenda-setting and decision-making; determining those who will be funded; selecting those who shall be corporatised into the global governance state, and relegating those who shall remain on the non-institutionalised outer. Rootes writes of the new urgency with which climate change has been embraced, as the story of climate has become such a large metanarrative that it almost embraces all elements of environmental discourse. He quotes its WWF's UK Chairman, Christopher Ward as follows:
…today, WWF's work is much wider and more complex. You cannot save the polar bear if the Arctic ice cap on which it lives melts away through global arming… WWF views climate change as the single greatest threat facing the planet… we have all joined the list of endangered species (Rootes, this volume).
Climate change is an important, global problem and despite the existence of factions of scientists still denying the problem, it seems one side -the side advocating the role of humans in creating global climate change -is now gaining a firm upper hand. The ascendancy has been gained by a combination of factors, including: i) the results of most forms of scientific experimentation in relation to, for example, the melting of ice-caps and rising sea level seem to be pointing this way; and ii) the pro-climate position -after an initial period of rejection -is now being championed, more and more, by powerful political and business interests at both the national and international levels, most particularly in the North (see Matthews and Paterson 2005) .
This recent embrace by parts of the business community, in part, can be linked to the ease with which climate change arguments can justify business-as-usual approaches, as well as their propensity to be mustered to promote the growth of the nuclear industry across the globe.
Despite this dominant position in the affluent world, many environmentalists in the South regard climate change as receiving excessive attention. It is seen as a matter endorsed by affluent world, western, science, and then utilised as an environmental security issue to control the less affluent from pursuing the very path of development which the minority world has pursued without restraint since the industrial revolution.
In the South, it is widely argued that there are more urgent environmental issues pertaining to the atmosphere that (Doyle and Risely 2007) revolve around issues of air pollution and their direct impacts upon human health. These issues are more reminiscent of those which evolved in the North during the 1970s, though in the case of the South these issues are exacerbated due to the size and rapidity of industrialisation, coupled with a profound lack of environmental and health infrastructure. In Friends of the Earth International some southern groups asked whether desertification and deforestation received less attention than climate change because their effects were mainly in the South.
A critical view of the predominant climate change discourse is that it takes much of the politics -the conflict -out of environmental resource issues, providing a polite filter between human action and human consequence; taking the direct and instrumental power relationships out of the equation. It is no longer people against people: the exploiters versus the exploited, or in this case, the polluters versus the polluted. Rather, although people are still the initiators, they are cast in a far more oblique light, often unwittingly setting off a calamitous, climactic punishment for all.
A force of nature is, in the end, the nemesis, whereas the initiators, the environmental degraders, are in relative safety, at a convenient one-step removed from the atrocities inflicted upon the many. Also, by constructing the concept of an environmental 'day of judgment' for all, all humans (all creation) are cast equally as victims; not differentiating between the perpetrators and fatalities.
Conclusion
Under neoliberal regimes, environmentalism is commonly a central plank in the construction of a new world order (both in Eastern Europe as well as in the South) pursued by networks and consortiums of transnational corporations, financial institutions, powerful, Northern green NGOs, and other transnational and national elites. These consortiums discipline populations into accepting conditionalities attached to aid and restructuring packages which include neoliberal markets; apolitical pluralist governance with its concomitant down-sized bureaucracy; and a particularly limited and toothless version of what constitutes environmentalism. In authoritarian regimes, it simultaneously denotes a politics of dissent and state authority.
But, of course, transnationalisation in a globalised world is multifarious and multidirectional. There is also dramatic evidence that in more recent times, Southern 14 movements are increasingly driving the global green movement agenda, with many Northern NGOs taking a subservient role for now. For the flow of history is a mirror opposite in the green movements of the minority world. Many movements in the North, began as postmaterialist movements, interested in trees, parks and threatened species, but are gradually coming to terms with the fact that people are also part of the environmental equation, they are not separate from nature. The beginnings of environmental justice and democracy movements are evolving in the North. This has occurred due largely to the amplified power of Southern movements in the last decade or so (Princen and Finger 1994: 8) .
It would be vacuous, however, to suggest that power moves equally both ways, like the tide, and that in the end some form of global balance will be struck. As there is no such thing as a free market, or a free lunch, there is also no such thing as a free political space. The amorphousness and structurelessness of social movements (alongside their cyberspace equivalent in the supposedly equally structurelessness Internet) may ultimately deliver results to the more powerful players.
Currently, however, a study of transnational environmental politics is more a celebration of differences than similarities: more evidence of the fact that there are many environmental movements across the earth rather than one. Regardless of very recent trends which suggest an increasing interplay between environmental movements across the world, however, the empirical reality is different. In fact, as is evidenced in all of the articles in this edition, profound differences in ideology and focus, rather than similarities, define the environmental movement experience between North and South, rather than cross-boundary, shared political activities/identities. Some environmental organisations -often part of a green governance state -will seek to globalise environmentalism through disciplining the local into a carefully constructed and restricted version of the global. These organisations will become increasingly moneyed, and progressively more powerful, and their politics of ecological conditionality, regardless of the honour of their intentions, can only be understood within a frame of postcolonialism. The majority of environmental movements across the globe, however, will persist in their varied attempts at environmental emancipation. In their salutation of diversity, and their attempts to resist the all-powerful but understandable urge to overly homogenise opposition, they will continue to forge resilient societal alternatives, emerging from a continued respect and reverence for diverse localised experiences within the multitude of ecological communities. Torgerson writes:
A green politics for a divided planet depends on an expansion of the green public sphere, but such a politics is necessarily a divided politics in the sense that it neither anticipates or achieves an undifferentiated unity. The divisions, however, do not necessarily spell a lack of connections. A green politics for a divided planet, indeed, depends upon interconnected spaces distinguished by intimations of, as well as approximations to, commonalities capable -at a minimum -of making disagreements somehow meaningful' (Torgerson this volume).
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